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LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF WEAPONIZED DRONES: 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 
INTRODUCTION 
What do children, adults, photographers, farmers, utilities, agriculture, oil 
and manufacturing companies, and law enforcement have in common? They 
all asked for a drone for Christmas. In fact, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) became concerned in October of 2015 with reports of 
at least one million Americans likely to find a drone under the tree on 
Christmas morning.1 However, one of these things is not like the other. While 
children, adults, farmers, and companies are using drones to monitor their own 
activities, law enforcement agencies are using drones to monitor the activities 
of others.2 While a step in the right direction for those concerned with the 
safety of our police officers, some see this as a platform for constitutional 
issues.3 Amongst these varying points of view are residents of North Dakota, 
where a bill was passed with the intention to enumerate and limit law 
enforcement’s use of drones.4 However, after a close reading of the finalized 
bill, the text itself may actually expand law enforcement’s use of drones, rather 
than limit it.5 
North Dakota passed House Bill 1328 into law on April 16, 2015, which 
“provide[s] for limitations on the use of unmanned aircraft for surveillance.”6 
The purpose of the act was to restrict law enforcement’s use of drones for 
surveillance efforts in the collection of criminal evidence.7 Along with these 
 
 1. Dan Reed, A Million Drones for Christmas? FAA Frets the Threat for Planes, FORBES 
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2015/10/01/drones-faa-christ 
mas/#11290e663f27 [https://perma.cc/F4SV-Y8LY]. 
 2. Domestic Drones, AM. C. L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/ 
surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones [https://perma.cc/DT3Y-QLPB]. 
 3. Eyragon Eidam, Reports on North Dakota Weaponized Drone Law Miss Larger Picture, 
GOV’T. TECH. (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Reports-on-North-Dakota-
Weaponized-Drone-Law-Miss-Larger-Picture.html [https://perma.cc/X6XS-7BXQ]. 
 4. Marco della Cava, Police Taser Drones Authorized in N.D., USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 
2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/08/28/police-Taser-drones-authorized 
—north-dakota/71319668/ [https://perma.cc/558X-NVBC]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. 2015). 
 7. Justin Glawe, First State Legalizes Taser Drones for Cops, Thanks to a Lobbyist, THE 
DAILY BEAST (Aug. 26, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/26/ 
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efforts, the original proposed bill included the language, “A state agency may 
not authorize the use of, including granting a permit to use, an unmanned 
aircraft armed with any lethal or nonlethal weapons, including firearms, pepper 
spray, bean bag guns, mace, and sound-based weapons.”8 However, after 
transformations by fellow lawmakers, the bill now reads, “[a] law enforcement 
agency may not authorize the use of, including granting a permit to use, an 
unmanned aerial vehicle armed with any lethal weapons.”9 Although the North 
Dakota bill’s purpose was to decrease law enforcement’s use of drones in 
criminal situations, after revisions, it now inadvertently allows the use of “non-
lethal” weapons, such as pepper spray, tear gas, Tasers, beanbag guns, or 
sound cannons to be mounted on drones.10 This is a win for some, but is 
concerning for others as implications of the legislation would give law 
enforcement the ability to incapacitate suspects from miles away.11 
As a St. Louis native, student at Saint Louis University School of Law, and 
prior law clerk at Emerson Electric, Co., located in Ferguson, Missouri, this 
kind of police power is particularly interesting to me. It gives rise to the 
question of how the dynamic of the riots, which occurred in Ferguson in 
August and November of 2014, would have been changed had Missouri police 
officers been allowed to use drones armed with “non-lethal” weapons. 
In this paper, I aim to explore the positive or negative implications of a 
similar bill being passed in Missouri by exploring the history leading up to this 
point and current advances in this area of law. To do so, Part I of this paper 
will address historical mergers between criminal procedure and privacy by 
considering prior and similar advances in the law regarding law enforcement’s 
use of technology and the resulting legal issues. This will include a review of 
historical and current constitutional issues, such as law enforcement’s use of 
infrared cameras and Tasers. Next, Part II will delve into the historical and 
current constitutional issues surrounding law enforcement’s use of aerial 
devices and consider the future of drones and other unmanned aerial devices in 
the eyes of criminal procedure. In addition, this part will give readers an 
overview of what a drone is and current regulations from the Federal Aviation 
Administration. In Part III, I will consider the use of “weaponized” drones. 
This will first be analyzed in the international context and will be followed by 




 8. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. Jan. 13, 2015). 
 9. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 10. Cava, supra note 4. 
 11. Rob Garver, North Dakota Police Can Now Legally Use Taser Drones, YAHOO 
FINANCE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/north-dakota-police-now-legally-1300 
00154.html [https://perma.cc/9W4P-4WV7]. 
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legislature regarding law enforcement’s use of weaponized drones. Finally, 
Part IV will specifically address the State of Missouri. It will examine current 
laws and pending legislation in the State of Missouri regarding law 
enforcement’s use of drones. This paper will conclude by considering the idea 
and the implications of allowing Missouri law enforcement to use weaponized 
drones, and how it would affect riot-like situations, such as those seen in 
Ferguson. 
I.  THE MERGING OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PRIVACY 
A. Fourth Amendment Searches 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.12 
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to redefine what 
constitutes an “unreasonable search” as technology develops. Starting in 1967, 
in its decision in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court considered how 
electronic listening devices affected the Fourth Amendment analysis of 
unreasonable searches.13 In this case, the Court found that the government’s 
use of an electronic recording device to eavesdrop on a conversation within a 
phone booth was indeed an unreasonable search.14 The Court returned to this 
same question in Kyllo v. United States, where it had to consider the 
government’s use of a thermal image scanner to search inside one’s home, 
finding once again that it was an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.15 A critical point of the holding in Kyllo focused on the fact that 
the technology used, a thermal imager, was not in general public use, creating 
a new test to be applied to the government’s use of technology in considering 
whether a search is unconstitutional.16 
However, the Supreme Court was confronted with a separate inquiry when 
looking at how the third-party doctrine applies to hidden wires17 and 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13. 389 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1967). 
 14. Id. at 353. 
 15. 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001). 
 16. Id. at 34. 
 17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (finding that the use of a wire is not an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, as there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in what is conveyed to a third party). 
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telephones.18 In the cases dealing with these issues, the Court held consistently 
with the third-party doctrine, finding that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in what one conveys to a third party, even if through electronic 
measures not in general public use. Significantly, in 2012, the Supreme Court 
revived the importance of constitutionally protected areas in regards to new 
technology in their decision in United States v. Jones.19 In Jones, the Court 
held that the government’s use of a GPS device on petitioner’s vehicle to 
monitor the whereabouts of the vehicle is an unreasonable search, as it is a 
“physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area.”20 As Justice Alito 
writes in his concurrence in Jones, “[n]ew technology may provide increased 
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find 
the tradeoff worthwhile.”21 
More recently, the circuits have been presented with constitutional issues 
regarding new technology that we may see rising to the Supreme Court. The 
Eleventh Circuit considered what privacy exists in the copious information 
obtained by cellphone companies in United States v. Davis.22 While, the 
Eleventh Circuit held consistently with the third party doctrine, we are left to 
question, when is the information too much and should we limit the amount 
that is to become available to the government?23 Additionally, the Tenth 
Circuit was faced with new technology in United States v. Denson, where the 
government used a Doppler radar device to sense whether a person was inside 
their home.24 Here, the court chose not to make a decision on whether the use 
of a Doppler radar device to peer inside a subject’s home was a Fourth 
Amendment violation, but rather opened the door for the Supreme Court by 
stating, “[i]t’s obvious to us and everyone else in this case that the 
government’s warrantless use of such a powerful tool to search inside homes 
 
 18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register 
on petitioner’s phone is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, as there is no 
expectation of privacy in the numbers that he conveyed to the third party telephone company). 
 19. 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012). 
 20. Id. at 951. 
 21. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 22. 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding, consistently with Smith, that where 
information is voluntarily and knowingly provided to a third party, such as location information 
from a cellphone, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 23. Id. at 541–43 (Martin, J., dissenting). In the dissent, Justice Martin reflects on the vast 
amount of information and need for limits on information given to the government without a 
warrant. He is quoted, “I reject a theory that allows the government such expansive access to 
information about where we are located, no matter how detailed a picture of our movements the 
government may receive.” Id. at 542–43. 
 24. 775 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2014) (making no decision regarding whether or not 
a Doppler radar device capable of detecting from outside the home the presence of a person inside 
is a Fourth Amendment violation, as the government had sufficient reason to believe that 
someone was inside based on other circumstances). 
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poses grave Fourth Amendment questions.”25 As the court effectively stated in 
Denson, “[n]ew technologies bring with them not only new opportunities for 
law enforcement to catch criminals but also new risks for abuse and new ways 
to invade constitutional rights.”26 
After a review of the Supreme Court cases regarding government’s use of 
technology to search our constitutionally protected areas of “persons, houses, 
papers and effects,” it is clear that the law is ever changing.27 Yet, it poses the 
question of whether the government’s use of drones for surveillance or 
imaging purposes constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.28 Will the 
Supreme Court consider them to be technology in “general public use”?29 Or 
will they find that the government’s use of drones is a “physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area”?30 The Supreme Court anticipates this, as 
stated in Denson, “[w]e don’t doubt for a moment that the rise of increasingly 
sophisticated and invasive search technologies will invite us to venture down 
this way again—and soon.”31 However, the “unreasonable searches” piece of 
the Fourth Amendment is not the only constitutional concern for law 
enforcement’s use of drones. 
B. Fourth Amendment: Unreasonable Seizures 
A Fourth Amendment seizure of a person occurs when law enforcement 
“by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [a 
person’s] freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”32 In its 
holding in Brendlin v. California, the Supreme Court puts forth two tests: 
physical force and show of authority.33 A “show of authority” has been defined 
as belief by a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave.34 The Court 
has found that a seizure occurs by “physical force” when law enforcement 
detains a person,35 arrests a person,36 or if they use deadly force to apprehend a 
suspect.37 In order to achieve a detainment or arrest, a police officer has the 
 
 25. Id. at 1218. 
 26. Id. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 28. Infra Part II. 
 29. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 30. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 
 31. United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 32. 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 33. Id.; 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 34. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991). 
 35. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968). 
 36. Id. at 16. 
 37. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
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ability to use reasonable force.38 However, issues arise when police officers 
use “excessive force” in their attempts to detain, arrest, or apprehend a suspect, 
as this form of physical force may be considered an “unreasonable seizure” 
and violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 Just as seen in regards to the 
“search” piece of the Fourth Amendment, there are also various forms of 
electronic equipment that have been employed to assist in a “seizure” by law 
enforcement. 
Among the various ways that police apprehend suspects, it is common 
practice for them to use Tasers.40 While one of the most controversial issues in 
criminal justice, police use of Tasers is completely legal.41 “Police can always 
use reasonable, non-deadly force to thwart any crime or to seize anyone the 
police officer reasonably believes to be fleeing from the commission of a crime 
or attempting to evade a lawful arrest.”42 Additionally, as held in Tennessee v. 
Garner, even if law enforcement’s use of a Taser results in death, it is still 
legal if the officer reasonably believed that the suspect posed a threat of serious 
injury or death to others.43 Whether the use of force is reasonable, depends on 
the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”44 These rules apply to 
other devices employed by law enforcement, such as bean bag guns, mace and 
tear gas.45 This presents an interesting dynamic to our analysis of law 
enforcement’s use of drones. Can law enforcement use drones armed with a 
Taser or tear gas to apprehend suspects, as long as the officer “reasonably 
believes [a suspect] to be fleeing from the commission of a crime or attempting 
to evade a lawful arrest”?46 Or, will the Court find this use of “armed” drones 
to be an “unreasonable seizure” by use of “excessive force”? Moreover, if the 
reasonableness is to be judged by the perspective of the officer on the scene, 
 
 38. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, When Does Use of Pepper Spray, Mace, or Other 
Similar Chemical Irritants Constitute Violation of Constitutional Rights, 65 A.L.R. 6th 93 (2011). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Elizabeth Seals, Police Use of Tasers: The Truth is “Shocking,” 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 109, 112 (2007) (“Tasers are currently used in police departments in every state across the 
United States, with the sole exception of New Jersey.”). 
 41. STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, USE OF TASERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES: GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2005), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/164097/doc/slspublic/Tasersv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3EC-
G2GW]. 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 45. Ralph Vartabedian, Ferguson, Mo., Police are Using a Blunt Instrument – Tear Gas, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
nn-tear-gas-ferguson-08132014-story.html [https://perma.cc/49M8-H85E]. Vartabedian states, 
“tear gas was first used more than a century ago, and ever since law enforcement agencies have 
been refining their policies for employing it.” Id. 
 46. STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 41, at 12. 
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can an officer truly evaluate the scene by use of a drone? As accurately quoted 
by Judge Martin in his dissent in Davis, “[i]f times have changed, reducing 
everyman’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world . . . the 
values served by the Fourth Amendment [are] more, not less, important.”47 
C. Law Enforcement’s Use of Force Within the Fourth Amendment 
In certain situations, the police may need to exert certain forms of force.48 
Specifically, force may be necessary in situations of protecting others or self-
defense.49 There is no universal definition or set of rules for the use of force.50 
Typically, each individual agency will set guidelines for their officers 
regarding when officers can use force and how much, but this is not required or 
standardized.51 These guidelines are commonly developed from use of force 
continuums, or a model of what scenarios require different forms of force.52 
However, the use of force is determined by the police officer on a case-by-
case basis.53 The International Association of Chiefs of Police has described 
use of force as the “amount of effort required by police to compel compliance 
by an unwilling subject.”54 Officers are trained to judge when a crisis requires 
force in order to protect oneself and others and regain control over a dangerous 
situation.55 Many times, time is the key variable in determining whether or not 
 
 47. U.S. v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)) (alterations in original). 
 48. Police Use of Force, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nij.gov/top 
ics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/8QB5-3S 
A3]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.nij. 
gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/Pages/continuum.aspx [https://perma.cc/3 
MRF-8CBG]. Generally, there are five levels in a standard use-of-force continuum. The first level 
is “officer presence,” whereby his presence alone and without the use of any force, the officer can 
deescalate and regain control over the situation. Second, “verbalization,” is where the officer uses 
non-physical force, such as verbal commands to control the situation. Third, if the situation 
continues to escalate, the use-of-force rises to “empty-hand control,” allowing the officer to 
employ bodily force, such as physically grabbing, holding, or restraining a suspect. Fourth, as the 
circumstances begin to become more dangerous, the police officer may now need to employ 
“less-lethal methods” to command control, this includes the use of batons, pepper spray, tear gas, 
Tasers, and other forms of non-lethal weapons. Finally, if the suspect poses a substantial threat to 
the life of the officer or a citizen, the officer may employ “lethal force,” using a deadly weapon, 
such as a firearm to seize the suspect indefinitely. Id. 
 53. Police Use of Force, supra note 48. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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an officer should use force and how much.56 However, when challenged in the 
courts, the Supreme Court has provided a guide.57 
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “what 
constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement 
officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory 
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.”58 Regarding this issue, the Court held 
that “such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 
‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due 
process standard.”59 In other words, when officers are confronted with 
situations where the use of force may be necessary in order to arrest someone, 
or to protect himself or another citizen, the officer must act in the same manner 
that a reasonable officer would have acted in a similar, tense, rapidly evolving 
situation.60 
The Court continues by stating that “[d]etermining whether the force used 
to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment 
requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing 
governmental interests at stake.”61 Further, the Court reminds us “[o]ur Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest 
or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of 
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”62 The Court then supplies what 
are now known as the Graham factors, which should be employed in 
determining whether the use of force is objectively reasonable: (1) “the 
severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–98 (1989). In Graham, petitioner was a diabetic 
and entered a grocery store to purchase an orange juice to help stabilize his sugar levels. Seeing 
that the checkout line was long, he left in a hurry, asking his friend to drive him to a friend’s 
house. An officer saw his erratic behavior and, thinking he may have committed a crime at the 
grocery store, seized him until receiving a report from the store of whether he had committed any 
crime. During this seizure, petitioner ran around the car twice and passed out on the curb. 
Believing this to be extremely unusual behavior, and believing petitioner to be drunk rather than a 
diabetic, the officer called in reinforcements and had petitioner arrested (while he was 
unconscious). Even after persistent pleading by his friend to allow petitioner to have sugar, and 
once conscious, petitioner begged the officers to check his diabetic card in his wallet, the police 
shoved his face into the hood of the car. He was held there until the police received a report of no 
wrongdoing at the grocery store. Petitioner “sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised 
forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear 
that continues to this day.” Id. at 388–90. 
 58. Id. at 388. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 397. 
 61. Id. at 396. 
 62. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
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threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”63 Essentially, this 
reasonableness test uses a totality of the circumstances determination. 
Some additional considerations the Court provides include, “the 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the 
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivation”64 and “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular 
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”65 
This type of analysis as applied to drones would be complex and delicate. 
If law enforcement began applying force by administering less-lethal methods, 
could an officer truly apply the Graham factors? It begs the question of 
whether or not an officer could reasonably evaluate the situation and apply the 
correct amount of force. This type of policing could potentially save lives of 
officers—or unfairly threaten lives of suspects. Either way, it would likely lead 
to an increase in excessive force lawsuits, which would hopefully provide 
judicial guidance as to whether law enforcement’s use of drones is legal. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF AERIAL DEVICES AND 
DRONES 
A. Supreme Court on Aerial Devices and the Constitution 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet offered any opinions regarding 
drone use, it has provided a starting point. In the 1986 case of California v. 
Ciraolo, the Supreme Court addressed law enforcement’s use of aircrafts when 
conducting a Fourth Amendment “search.”66 In Ciraolo, the Court confirmed 
that law enforcement’s use of aerial surveillance on a fixed-wing aircraft in 
public navigable airspace to conduct a search does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.67 Chief Justice Burger notes, “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply 
does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to 
obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”68 This 
decision was reaffirmed in Florida v. Riley as applied to a helicopter flying at 
400 feet overhead, where the Court stated “Riley could not reasonably have 
expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation 
from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 397. 
 65. Id. at 396. 
 66. 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986). 
 67. Id. at 215. 
 68. Id. 
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wing aircraft.”69 Although Ciraolo and Riley seemingly set out a bright line 
rule, many courts have interpreted it strictly.70 
In the majority of cases regarding warrantless aerial surveillance, courts 
have found the observation to be relatively non-intrusive on one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, thus finding that the surveillance is not a Fourth 
Amendment violation.71 However, there are some situations, where “the means 
of surveillance [were] sufficiently intrusive so as to give rise to a constitutional 
violation.”72 In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the State of New 
Mexico, the court cites two cases in which the intrusiveness of the warrantless 
aerial search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.73 In the first case, 
Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that law 
enforcement’s use of a helicopter to perform aerial surveillance of appellee’s 
barn from fifty feet above was unconstitutional as it was overly intrusive and 
created a risk of harm to appellee and her property.74 Similarly, in People v. 
Pollock, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that aerial surveillance by police 
was more intrusive than mere observation because the helicopter (1) 
“descended to 200 feet,” (2) “hovered in the area for several minutes,” and (3) 
made “enough noise that numerous people ran out” to see what the noise 
was.75 
On review of these cases as well as Ciraolo and Riley, the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico promotes two conclusions.76 First, aerial observations of 
public navigable airspace are generally permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment when they are relatively unobtrusive.77 However, second, when 
the aerial surveillance becomes more than just an observation and creates an 
intrusive environment for those on the ground—causing high amounts of wind, 
unreasonable amounts of dust and noise, damaging objects, and raising alarm 
amongst citizens—the aerial activity rises to a point of an unreasonable 
search.78 Thus, the court holds similarly to Oglialoro and Pollock, and contrary 
to Ciraolo and Riley, that prolonged hovering close to the ground, which 
causes intrusion onto a citizen’s person and property, is an unreasonable search 
and thus requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.79 Overall, the court 
 
 69. 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989). 
 70. Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 579 A.2d 1288, 1294 (Pa. 1990); People v. Pollock, 796 
P.2d 63, 65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); New Mexico v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1166 (N.M. 2015). 
 71. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1170. 
 72. Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 4:5 (3d ed. 1996). 
 73. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1170–71. 
 74. Oglialoro, 579 A.2d at 1294. 
 75. Pollock, 796 P.2d at 63. 
 76. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1171. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1172. 
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introduces certain factors to take into account when determining when aerial 
surveillance is indeed too intrusive.80 These factors include (1) “the legality of 
the flight,” (2) “the altitude of the aircraft,” (3) “the frequency and duration of 
the flight,” and (4) “the nature of the area observed.”81 Although seemingly 
reasonable, these factors and determination have yet to be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. Yet, it seems as if it had an inkling that it may return to this 
issue in the future. 
The dissent in Ciraolo looks to Justice Harlan’s warning in his concurrence 
in Katz, that we must be careful with “future electronic developments and the 
potential for electronic interference with private communications.”82 However, 
Chief Justice Burger disputes this by stating, 
[o]ne can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft 
within the category of future ‘electronic’ developments that could stealthily 
intrude upon an individual’s privacy. In an age where private and commercial 
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to 
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being 
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.83 
Yet, this bears the question of whether a drone is to be considered within this 
category of concerning “future electronic developments.” The New Mexico 
Court of Appeals, which was reversed in Davis, seemed to think this was an 
important consideration. 
The Court of Appeals in New Mexico advanced that the New Mexico 
Constitution should account for law enforcement’s future use of “ultra-quiet 
drones” and other high tech devices by moving away from an “intrusion 
analysis.”84 Instead, it proposed this test to determine whether an aerial search 
by law enforcement was constitutional: 
[I]f law enforcement personnel, via targeted aerial surveillance, have the 
purpose to intrude and attempt to obtain information from a protected area, 
such as the home or its curtilage, that could not otherwise be obtained without 
physical intrusion into that area, that aerial surveillance constitutes a search for 
purposes of Article II, Section 10.85 
The New Mexico Supreme Court declined to adopt this provision, or even 
comment on drones at all, as it found it “unnecessary to speculate about 
problems—and futuristic technology—that may or may not arise in the 
future.”86 However, the future is here and so are drones. 
 
 80. Id. at 1169. 
 81. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1169. 
 82. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986). 
 83. Id. at 215. 
 84. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1172. 
 85. Id. at 1183 (quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). 
 86. Id. at 1172. 
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We next question whether or not it is unreasonable for a United States 
citizen to believe that he or she is constitutionally protected from being 
observed by a drone flying within navigable airspace. In attempt to answer 
some of these questions, we must first establish what is considered to be an 
aircraft and whether a drone fits into this category. 
B. Drones and Current Laws Regarding Drones 
Drones or domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) are “autonomous 
aerial vehicles that are equipped with cameras or other sensors in order to 
collect assorted data from an aerial vantage point.”87 Whether or not one must 
register a drone with the FAA depends on the type of use.88 If a drone is being 
used for personal use, such as for recreation or hobby, the operator does not 
need permission by the FAA to fly the UAV.89 However, there are certain 
limitations, including the requirement to register the UAV with the FAA if it 
weighs over .55 pounds, it must be flown in non-populous areas, and should 
remain within sight of the operator.90 On the other hand, if the UAV is being 
used for public operations, governmental purposes, or for civil operations 
(non-governmental business purposes), it requires registration and a certified 
operator.91 
When a company or person would like to fly a UAV for a non-personal or 
non-governmental purpose, it is considered a “civil aircraft operation” and 
must meet FAA regulations.92 In order to meet these requirements, one must 
gain authorization by one of two methods: Section 333 Exemption,93 or 
Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC).94 Similarly, if a government entity 
(such as a law enforcement agency) wishes to fly a UAV, it must also follow 
 
 87. UNIV. OF WASHINGTON TECH. AND PUBLIC POL’Y CLINIC, DOMESTIC DRONES: 
TECHNICAL AND PRIVACY ISSUES (2013), http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/technology/re 
ports/droneslawandpolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFC6-TH3M]. 
 88. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.faa.gov/uas/ 
[https://perma.cc/G22S-ACJH]. 
 89. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FAA (Oct. 7, 2016, 
2:35 PM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/36PU-L6EH]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. UVA FAA Civil Operations UAV Regulations: Civil Operations (Non-Governmental), 
HOMELAND SURVEILLANCE & ELEC., http://www.hse-uav.com/faa_civil_operations_nongovern 
mental.htm [https://perma.cc/5KBD-JC96] (revised Nov. 11, 2016). 
 93. Id. (“Section 333 Exemption – a grant of exemption in accordance with Section 333 
AND a civil Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA); this process may be used to perform 
commercial operations in low-risk, controlled environments.”). 
 94. Id. (“Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC) – applicants must be able to describe how 
their system is designed, constructed, and manufactured, including engineering processes, 
software development and control, configuration management, and quality assurance procedures 
used, along with how and where they intend to fly.”). 
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certain regulations.95 However, limitations on “public aircraft operations” are 
defined by federal statute.96 
Title 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) provides the definition of “public aircraft” 
as “an aircraft used only for the United States Government,” and “[a]n aircraft 
owned by the Government and operated by any person for purposes related to 
crew training, equipment development, or demonstration,” among various 
other definitions.97 42 U.S.C. § 40125 provides the qualifications for public 
aircraft status.98 Under this statute, whether a UAV flight qualifies as “public 
aircraft operation” is determined on a “flight-by-flight basis.”99 In making this 
determination, the FAA considers “aircraft ownership, the operator, the 
purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the aircraft.”100 In order for a 
public aircraft operation to legally take place, the FAA must issue a Certificate 
of Waiver or Authorization, which allows public agencies (including law 
enforcement) to operate a UAV for a specified purpose in a specified area.101 
From this overview of current law and procedure regarding UAVs in 
public navigable airspace, it is clear that law enforcement may use drones, 
given they meet the statutory and administrative regulations.102 When 
interpreting this analysis alongside Ciraolo, with the FAA and United States 
Code classification of drones as aircrafts, at least in the context of public 
operations, it is likely that these devices would fall within the holding of an 
aircraft in public navigable airspace.103 Thus, under this interpretation of 
Ciraolo, law enforcement’s use of drones to operate a “search” within 
navigable public airspace would not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
unless it is overly intrusive or cause harm to people or property below. 
Here, we reach a critical point in the analysis: if law enforcement can use 
drones for “searches,” what are the limits on the use of drones for “seizures”? 
 
 95. Advisory Circular No: 00-1.1A at 6, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.: U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP. 
(Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1_ 
1A.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GHM-XYY6]. 
 96. Id. at 2, 6(c), (d). 
 97. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2012). 
 98. § 40125. As previously mentioned, law enforcement falls under this category as 
described in § 40125(a)(2): “The term ‘governmental function’ means an activity undertaken by a 
government, such as national defense, intelligence missions, firefighting, search and rescue, law 
enforcement (including transport of prisoners, detainees, and illegal aliens), aeronautical research, 
or biological or geological resource management.” 
 99. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 95, at 8(a). 
 100. Id. at 6(b). 
 101. Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (last modified 
Aug. 19, 2016, 8:21 AM), https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service 
_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa [https://perma.cc/DR72-ULY3]. 
 102. Id.; see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 95, at 6(a), (c). 
 103. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986). 
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III.  WEAPONIZED DRONES—THE FUTURE OR THE NOW? 
A. International Use of Weaponized Drones 
In 2011, headlines broke in The Washington Post and The New York Times 
that the United States had built a secret drone base in Saudi Arabia.104 Even 
more alarming were reports of the first lethal mission by the drone base in 
September of 2011.105 Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and alleged al-
Qaida terrorist, was killed by a drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 
2011.106 In 2010, the Obama Administration authorized the targeted killing of 
al-Awlaki due to his ties to terrorism.107 Generally, international law allows a 
country to use lethal force against an individual or group if it poses an 
imminent threat to that country, which is how al-Awlaki became a “kill or 
capture” target of the United States.108 Al-Awlaki was the first American to be 
placed on the CIA’s “kill or capture” list.109 He was also the first American 
citizen to be hunted and killed by the United States government without a trial 
since the Civil War.110 Moreover, he was the only American to be directly 
targeted and killed by a government drone.111 His death poses interesting 
constitutional issues, such as al-Awlaki’s right to free speech under the First 
Amendment and right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.112 
However, could the government defend this action by way of the Fourth 
Amendment by claiming that this was a legal and authorized seizure by use of 
lethal force due to the threat of serious injury or death to others? How far could 
 
 104. Noah Shachtman, Is This the Secret U.S. Drone Base in Saudi Arabia?, WIRED (Feb. 7, 
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 107. Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
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 110. Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. 
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this theory be extended within our everyday society? How close to home are 
these weaponized drones? To answer these questions, we must take a historic 
look at the rise of weaponized drones internationally. 
Although there are numerous companies that are manufactures and 
providers of UAVs, there are some companies that specialize in modifying 
drones in order to equip them with various weapons.113 For example, Desert 
Wolf, a South African company, has designed a drone that is able to administer 
pepper spray and non-lethal paintballs on individuals or crowds.114 The 
purpose of these weaponized drones are to “contain ‘unruly crowds’ and 
‘violent protests.’”115 This drone, called the Skunk Copter, is equipped with 
four “high-capacity gun barrels,” each of which is capable of firing up to 
“4,000 paintballs, pepper spray balls and solid plastic balls at rates of up to 80 
balls per second.”116 This company is providing these drones to customers 
within South Africa as well as customers in countries outside of South 
Africa.117 Clients include security companies, police forces, and numerous 
other industrial customers.118 
A law enforcement agency in Lucknow, India, has already begun 
experimenting with weaponized drones.119 In order to keep control over rowdy 
crowds and mobs, the police have begun equipping drones with pepper 
spray.120 Lucknow’s police chief has been quoted saying “[w]e are planning to 
use these drones to control unruly mobs by showering them with pepper 
spray.”121 According to The Indian Express, this police force has already 
purchased a fleet of drones that can lift up almost four and a half pounds.122 In 
other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, where the military controls the 
airspace, weaponized military UAVs are already being used in civilian 
airspace.123 
 
 113. Riot Control Drone Armed with Paintballs and Pepper Spray Hits Market, RT NEWS 
(June 19, 2014, 23:42), https://www.rt.com/news/167168-riot-control-pepper-spray-drone/ 
[https://perma.cc/39A7-RM53]. 
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 118. RT NEWS, supra note 113. 
 119. Wochit News, Police to Use Pepper-Spraying Drone on Crowds in India, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://youtu.be/JTJutZuimso [https://perma.cc/Y8EV-5EDM]. 
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 123. Jessica Elgot, Police Drones: Unmanned Air Vehicles Could Monitor Protests, Riots and 
Traffic in UK, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 
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Further, in the United Kingdom, the Police Minister has endorsed the use 
of drones “to patrol the UK’s skies, to monitor criminal activity and provide air 
support, saying they should be treated like ‘any other piece of police kit.’”124 
However, the Police Minister notes that due to the already crowded airspace by 
civil and military aircrafts, the use of police drones would likely take a while to 
get approved.125 But, once restrictions are lifted, he envisions them having 
every right that is afforded to a police helicopter.126 Yet, the use of drones by 
law enforcement is not only an international operation. 
Police use of drones is much closer to home than one may think. In 2015, 
forty-five of the fifty states considered legislation regarding drones.127 The 
majority of the bills were aimed at protecting privacy by restricting the use of 
drones for unwarranted surveillance.128 Although many state legislatures are 
trying to keep up with technology, it seems as if the government agencies may 
be a few steps ahead. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, as of 
2013, at least fifteen states have law enforcement agencies that have either 
applied for drone authorization from the Federal Aviation Administration or 
have borrowed drones from the Customs and Border Protections for special 
operations.129 Additionally, we have seen the rise in legislation regarding the 
use of weaponized drones within the United States.130 In both South Carolina 
and Tennessee, bills have been proposed which prohibit the equipping of 
privately owned UAVs with any form of weapon.131 However, this does not 
apply to government agencies, thus providing a loophole for drones utilized by 
police to be equipped with lethal and non-lethal weapons.132 Although many 
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believe the likelihood of these types of bills being passed is low, a bill of this 
nature has already been enacted—in North Dakota.133 So, what does this mean 
for Missouri? 
IV.  MISSOURI LEGISLATION AND DRONES 
A. Legislation in the State of Missouri Regarding Law Enforcement’s Use of 
Drones 
Since 2013, three bills have been proposed in Missouri attempting to 
restrict the use of drones.134 Missouri House Bill 46, which is now dead, was 
proposed with the purpose to “prohibit[] the use of a drone or other aircraft to 
gather evidence or other information with specified exceptions.”135 This bill 
proposed three restrictions to the use of drones.136 First, it restricts anyone, 
including government agencies and law enforcement from using a drone to 
conduct any type of surveillance regarding potential criminal activity without a 
warrant.137 Second, it restricts all users of unmanned aerial devices from flying 
and using the device for conducting surveillance under the “doctrine of open 
fields” without consent of the landowner.138 Finally, it places a broad 
restriction on anyone, including journalists or news organizations, from using 
drones to conduct surveillance over any private property without the consent of 
the landowner.139 It does, however, provide an exception for law enforcement, 
allowing them to use a drone if exigent circumstances exist, such as when “a 
law enforcement agency possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular 
circumstances, swift action to prevent imminent danger to life is necessary.”140 
Although no bills regarding drones or unmanned aircrafts have been passed yet 
in Missouri, it is safe to say that we have not seen the last of these types of 
legislation, as there are many proponents and critics on each side. 
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B. Implications of Allowing Missouri Law Enforcement to Use Weaponized 
Drones 
One of St. Louis’s largest proponents of law enforcement’s use of drones is 
Chief of Police, Sam Dotson, who is working to make it happen.141 Dotson has 
already requested allowance from the Federal Aviation Administration for St. 
Louis Police Department to use drones.142 Among other reasons, Dotson 
envisions using drones in St. Louis to circle Busch Stadium to scan for 
terrorists or pursue a suspect in a car chase.143 He endorses his position by 
stating “[i]f we are serious about crime reduction strategies, we must look to 
new technologies which help keep officers and the public safe and apprehend 
criminals.”144 Former St. Louis Circuit Attorney, Jennifer Joyce, is also an 
enthusiastic supporter of the St. Louis police force’s use of drones.145 Although 
Dotson, Joyce, and even St. Louis City Mayor, Francis Slay, see this as a safer 
way to apprehend suspects, others see it as a constitutional abuse.146 
Jeffrey Mittman, Executive Director of American Civil Liberties Union of 
Eastern Missouri, sees this as “a significant expansion of government 
surveillance.”147 He argues that “[o]ur laws have not kept up with our privacy 
rights. Our Fourth Amendment privacy rights aren’t safe from unreasonable 
search and seizure when you’re looking at drones.”148 Even though Dotson’s 
petition to the FAA was for drones merely armed with cameras and no other 
lethal or non-lethal devices, it raises suspicion as to how long it would take 
until this changed.149 These concerns regarding law enforcement’s use of 
weaponized drones in the St. Louis area stems from what was seen in 
Ferguson, Missouri in 2014.150 
Anyone who turned on the news on August 9, 2014 could have reasonably 
believed he or she was watching footage of a combat zone, rather than the 
 
 141. Christine Byers, St. Louis Police Chief Wants Drones to Monitor City from the Sky, ST. 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Jun. 23, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-
louis-police-chief-wants-drones-to-monitor-city-from/article_1f0a7488-855d-52cf-9590-03129ce 
48a06.html [https://perma.cc/4LM8-C49U]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Byers, supra note 141. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Kylie Bourne, Police Militarization Takes Off With Weaponized Drones, DISCOVER 
MAGAZINE: DRONE 360 (Sept. 14, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/drone360/ 
2015/09/14/police-militarization-weaponized-drones/#.VwHDd3gQpUR [https://perma.cc/3GQY 
-RSHE]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF WEAPONIZED DRONES 369 
streets of Ferguson, Missouri.151 During the protests surrounding the death of 
Michael Brown, Ferguson Police lined the streets in riot gear and militarized 
equipment.152 Amongst other tactics, the police deployed copious amounts of 
tear gas on protestors without warning.153 These militarized police tactics have 
led to public outcry, as well as lawsuits filed.154 These suits, filed against three 
Missouri police agencies, have settled, requiring that police warn protestors 
before deploying tear gas and allowing them to disperse, unless the harm is 
truly imminent.155 However, many questions and concerns plague this nation 
in regards to the law enforcement’s use of drones in similar riot-like situations. 
How would these regulations apply to drones? Could a drone administer 
tear gas or other invasive forms of crowd control? Is it likely that we could see 
drones used in a manner similar to that of Lucknow, India? Is it reasonable to 
believe that police could properly provide warning for protestors to disperse 
when they are operating from a distance with drones? Could a police officer 
reasonably assess whether or not harm is truly imminent from a drone? In an 
area, such as St. Louis, which has seen a fair share of dangerous unrest and a 
police force that responds in a militarized fashion, law enforcement’s use of 
drones, weaponized or not, is a realm of hot debate. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two sides to every debate, and the debate regarding law 
enforcement’s use of weaponized drones is not unlike any other. Proponents to 
the police’s use of drones see this as a way to protect our men and women in 
blue. Critics of law enforcement’s use of weaponized drones see it as an 
unsettling step in the direction of overly-militarized police forces and possible 
violations of our constitutional rights. As simply stated, “[t]he balance is 
between a technology that potentially can have a lot of private and public 
benefit along with some very real privacy and safety concerns.”156 
However, this paper can boil down to a single question—if law 
enforcement can use non-lethal weapons to seize a suspect, why can’t they use 
a drone armed with a non-lethal weapon to do the same? I argue that under 
Graham, when assessing the reasonableness of a particular use of force, such 
as tear gas dispersed from a drone, it will likely cause an issue as to whether 
 
 151. Terry Goldsworthy, Urban Combat: Ferguson and the Militarisation of Police, THE 
CONSERVATION (Aug. 18, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://theconversation.com/urban-combat-ferguson-
and-the-militarisation-of-police-30568 [https://perma.cc/KQ53-GS2L]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Sarah Begley, Missouri Police Will Restrict Tear Gas After Ferguson Lawsuit, TIME 
(Mar. 27, 2015), http://time.com/3761460/missouri-police-restrict-tear-gas/ [https://perma.cc/53 
JB-4LX3]. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Adler, supra note 127. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
370 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:351 
the officer could truly assess the situation and administer the proper amount of 
force. As we see more and more legislation passed allowing law enforcement 
agencies to use weaponized drones, we will likely be faced with an increase in 
excessive force lawsuits. As the ACLU wrote in an article criticizing the North 
Dakota bill allowing law enforcement to arm drones with non-lethal weapons, 
“[d]rones make it too easy to use force.”157 It can be argued that these kinds of 
bills “open the door to increasing weaponization,” and “increase the 
militarization of police.”158 This is exactly what we saw in Ferguson, and what 
many are afraid of seeing again—even if only from the eye of a drone. 
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